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As the pace of technological change has quickened and global competi-
tion has shortened product life cycles, ﬁrms have had to rethink their tech-
nology investment strategies and their human resource management prac-
tices in order to remain competitive. The main contribution of this chapter
is to examine the relationship between ﬁrm-level technological advance-
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The Eﬀect of HRM Practices 
and R&D Investment on 
Worker Productivity
Fredrik Andersson, Clair Brown, Benjamin Campbell,
Hyowook Chiang, and Yooki Parkment (as proxied by research and development investment [R&D]) and
ﬁrms’ human resource management (HRM) practices for high-skill work-
ers in a high-tech industry, and then examine how this relationship is con-
nected to ﬁrm performance.
Although the relationship of technological change and labor market
outcomes at the individual-worker level has been well-studied,1 surpris-
ingly little is known about what happens within the ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, there
is little empirical research on whether ﬁrms’ technology choices are con-
sistent with their human resource practices and whether there is a statisti-
cal relationship between technology, human resources, and performance
at the ﬁrm level.
At the individual level, there is a long line of research observing the cor-
relation of technical change and compensation for high-skill workers and
examining the mechanisms underlying the relationship.2 However, there is
little large-scale work looking at the relationship of technology and worker
outcomes within ﬁrms. In this project, we examine the worker/technology
relationship within ﬁrms and focus on one speciﬁc industry where we can
employ detailed industry controls.
Previous research has demonstrated that technology interacts with hu-
man resource practices through several channels. Technology may alter the
development of and returns to human capital (Krueger 1993; Handel 1999;
DiNardo and Pischke 1997; and Entorf and Kramarz 1998). Additionally,
technology can interact with individual outcomes through changes in work
design (Hunter and Lafkas 2003; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002;
Zuboﬀ 1988; Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2002; Brown et al. 1997; and Bar-
ley and Orr 1997) or changes in work organization (Cappelli 1996; Bres-
nahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002; O’Shaughnessy, Levine, and Cappelli
2001; and Caroli and Van Reenen 2001).
We propose a mechanism connecting technology and HRM practices at
the ﬁrm level that links the skill bias and the organization change ap-
proaches. We propose a make-versus-buy model of workforce skill adjust-
ment. If technology and labor force skills are complements in a ﬁrm’s pro-
duction function, and if the HRM system impacts the cost of acquiring,
developing, and retaining the portfolio of skills in a ﬁrm, then the ﬁrm’s
choice of HRM system aﬀects its ability to adjust worker skill levels to
maximize the value of their technological investments. In other words, if
ﬁrms choose to augment the skill of their workforce to complement an in-
vestment in technology, they face the traditional make-versus-buy prob-
lem. Firms can structure their HRM practices to develop and retain the
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1. See Brown and Campbell (2002) for a detailed review of the impact of technological
change on the work and wages of individuals.
2. Seminal works in this area include Bound and Johnson (1992), Levy and Murnane
(1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Berman, Bound, and
Griliches (1994), and Allen (1997).necessary skills in-house, or they can structure their HRM practices to at-
tract and recruit workers with the necessary skills on the external market.
For the econometric portion of the chapter, we utilize data from the Lon-
gitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program that covers
all establishments and their employees in seven large states over the period
1992 to 2001. Our analysis and interpretation is informed by ﬁeldwork
through the Sloan Competitive Semiconductor Manufacturing Program.
The ﬁeldwork began in 1992 and involved detailed data collection and in-
tensive interviews at over three dozen semiconductor manufacturing ﬁrms.
The insights and understanding developed through these site visits are the
basis of our examination of the HRM-technology-productivity relation-
ship in manufacturing ﬁrms within the electronics industry.
The analysis capitalizes on the strengths of both detailed industry study
and large-scale survey approaches to develop a framework for estimating
the relationship between ﬁrm productivity, R&D, and HRM practices us-
ing near-universal data from the LEHD program. The detailed industry
knowledge facilitates interpreting of the results and understanding the
context in which the results are embedded. This combined method expands
the “insider econometrics” approach to the industry level of analysis.
Industries exhibit wide variation in their market and organizational
structures, which aﬀects their rate of technological change, their degree of
and response to global competition, and, in general, their reaction to envi-
ronmental factors. Because industries diﬀer in dimensions that are hard to
measure using traditional large-scale survey responses, industry-speciﬁc
knowledge gained through ﬁeldwork is critical in understanding how to in-
terpret estimated statistical relationships within and across industries
(Brown, Haltiwanger, and Lane 2006). Fieldwork research allows us to
study the trade-oﬀs that managers make in developing and implementing
new technology and HRM practices, and they help us understand the tim-
ing of these decisions. Although technology and HRM practices are re-
lated through the production process, we observe that technological
changes can be implemented much faster and, therefore, more often than
HRM practices can be changed. Firms’ choice of HRM practices can be
made more independently of the external market than the choice of a new
technology, which is tied to a choice of customers and markets.
While it is important to understand the underlying structure of a ﬁrm to
interpret results, detailed ﬁrm or industry studies cannot be used for gen-
eralizations across ﬁrms or industries or for estimating national impact be-
cause we do not know whether the speciﬁc ﬁrm experiences are represen-
tative (Sturgeon et al. 2006). In order to generalize from an industry study,
we need estimations from a comprehensive survey across ﬁrms and work-
ers in the industry that show the observed relationship across key variables,
such as HRM practices, R&D expenditures, and productivity. Our ap-
proach is to combine comprehensive micro-data and detailed industry
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the quality and usefulness of both types of data. For micro-data to be es-
timated and interpreted properly, research teams must have both a deep
understanding of the industries involved and expertise in the use of micro-
data.
Speciﬁcally, this study combines both micro-data and detailed industry
knowledge to analyze the impact of R&D and HRM systems on ﬁrm per-
formance within the electronics industry (Standard Industrial Classiﬁca-
tion [SIC] 35 and 36).3 Although ﬁrms in the electronics industry have a
high level of R&D investment relative to other industries, there is a large
variance in investment between ﬁrms within the industry. Studying one in-
dustry simpliﬁes the analysis of the relationship of R&D and HRM by fo-
cusing on ﬁrms that are fairly comparable in structure and face similar
market trends and measurement issues.
We use workers’ outcomes within establishments to construct a variety
of measures of establishment-level HRM outcomes for high-education
workers and then link these HRM measures to plant and ﬁrm character-
istics. First, we document the ﬁrms’ HRM systems. Implementation of
HRM systems is more important than implementation of individual com-
ponents because there are synergies and complementarities in HRM prac-
tices (Kandel and Lazear 1992; and Milgrom and Roberts 1995). We per-
form a cluster analysis of ﬁrms and HRM measures to identify and
describe the most common HRM systems. Next, we employ principal com-
ponents analysis to identify groups of correlated HRM measures. We then
regress worker productivity on the principal HRM components interacted
with R&D.
We ﬁnd substantial variation in HRM practices for high-education work-
ers across ﬁrms in this industry. Human resource management bundles ap-
pear to include both spot market and internal labor market outcomes. Con-
sistent with Bauer and Bender’s (2004) ﬁnding using comparable German
data that technological advancement is correlated with worker churning for
high-skilled workers, we ﬁnd that for ﬁrms with high levels of R&D, HRM
practices that provide multiple ports of entry, low turnover and perfor-
mance incentives are positively related to worker productivity. For low
R&D ﬁrms, HRM practices that oﬀer multiple ports of entry and low wage
variance for recent hires are positively related to productivity. Additionally,
the results indicate strong clustering of HRM practices across ﬁrms, with
high R&D ﬁrms much more likely to implement more market-oriented
practices than low R&D ﬁrms in this high-tech industry. These ﬁndings are
consistent with the implications of our make-versus-buy model of work-
force skills, where ﬁrms with a high rate of technological change that buy
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3. The LEHD program links universal and longitudinal records on employees’ earnings
and employment from states’ Unemployment Insurance (UI) systems with detailed cross-
sectional data from Census Bureau’s Economic Censuses and Census/NSF R&D surveys.new skills on the external market and selectively retain and reward experi-
enced workers will demonstrate higher productivity than comparable ﬁrms
with fewer ports of entry with similar earnings growth, which indicates
more internal skill development. Also, ﬁrms with a low rate of technologi-
cal change implement HRM systems that are consistent with providing
training to workers rather than buying required skills, which may be more
eﬃcient in these ﬁrms with slower technological change.
The next section presents a framework for ﬁrms’ R&D investment deci-
sions and ﬁrms’ HRM decisions and how these decisions are related to
productivity. Then we describe the data set and our measurements for
HRM practices, R&D investment, ﬁrm performance, and other ﬁrm char-
acteristics. We present statistical results on ﬁrm performance, HRM, and
R&D and discuss to what extent the results are consistent with our hy-
potheses. Finally, we conclude with a summary and a discussion of the im-
plications of the research.
1.2 HRM Practices and Workforce Skill Adjustment Costs
Our analysis looks at HRM practices within ﬁrms and builds on the In-
ternal Labor Market analysis embedded in the work of Prendergast (1996)
and Doeringer and Piore (1971). In the empirical work, there is mixed evi-
dence on measuring internal labor markets within ﬁrms. Using data from
a single ﬁrm, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994) ﬁnd that some aspects
of the employment relationship are consistent with the theory of internal
labor markets. Lazear and Oyer (2004) use matched data from the Swedish
Employers Confederation from 1970 to 1990. They ﬁnd that the strict
model of internal labor markets does not seem to hold because external
forces play a large role in ﬁrms’ wage setting policies. Topel and Ward
(1992) observe high mobility and earnings growth among young male
workers that is more consistent with matching models and on-the-job
search than internal labor markets. Because of the mixed evidence, we per-
form a cluster analysis of ﬁrms in our sample to examine the distribution
of diﬀerent sets of HRM practices and ﬁnd a diverse set of HRM out-
comes, even within a homogenous industry.
Given the diverse outcomes, we focus on developing an understanding
of the underlying process that might explain the diversity. The basic con-
cept of the framework is that HRM practices aﬀect the cost structure of
how ﬁrms adjust the skills of their workforce. If technology and worker
skills are complementary, then the ﬁrm’s HRM decisions and R&D deci-
sions will be related.
Even in the high-tech electronics sector, the speed of technological
change varies across ﬁrms in diﬀerent product markets. For example, con-
sider the semiconductor industry, which is one of the industries included in
our sample. Within the semiconductor industry, graphic chips for video
games typically have a generation life of approximately eighteen months
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chips and microprocessors typically have a generation life between two and
three years. Generation life is critical in deﬁning a ﬁrm’s constraints in
making technological investment, as product prices are above marginal
costs early in the cycle before supply brings the prices down. Across the
electronics industry more broadly, product life and speed of technological
change have an even longer time horizon. For example, our sample also in-
cludes manufactures of “current-carrying wiring devices.” In contrast to
the semiconductor industry, the wire industry is marked by very long prod-
uct life spans and low levels of innovation.
The ﬁrm’s HRM system structures how labor inputs are bought and cre-
ated over time. We assume the cost of labor inputs are determined by the
following HRM practices:
• Screening and hiring
• Skill development (both learning by doing and formal training)
• Retention of experienced workers
• Adjustments in headcount by skill (quits and layoﬀs)
At any given point in time, these HRM practices determine the cost and
skills of the ﬁrm’s workforce. Here we focus only on high-education workers
because they are the workers who develop and implement new technology.
If ﬁrms adopt a technological change that alters the optimal composi-
tion of their workforce, ﬁrms may choose to adjust the skills embedded in
their workforce. Given the decision to adjust workforce skills, ﬁrms must
make two major decisions in creating the optimal skill-experience compo-
sition in the workforce:
1. Decide whether to provide formal training in the new technology to
their existing workers or to purchase these skills through new hires (we call
this the make-buy decision)
2. Decide which experienced engineers (and other workers) they will re-
tain (we call this the retention decision)
The ﬁrm will make the ﬁrst decision based upon the relative costs, in-
cluding both the payroll costs and the time-to-market costs, of making or
buying the required skills for the new technology. Under the assumption
that the cost of “making” the required skills is the worker adjustment cost
of acquiring skills (training cost) and is proportional to the size of techno-
logical jumps over a given time, and that the cost of “buying” the required
skills is the ﬁrm’s adjustment costs in hiring new workers, which is invariant
to the size of the technological jump, then for suﬃciently large technologi-
cal jumps, “buying” will be relatively less costly than “making” new skills.
The second decision will depend upon the costs of retention as well as
the production function. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms will structure incentive systems
to retain the workers who are most valuable to the ﬁrm. For a new tech-
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the ﬁrm must decide which workers to retain. This decision depends on the
portfolio of skills supplied in the ﬁrm compared to the portfolio of skills
necessary for the new technology and the costs of obtaining the new port-
folio, which include a comparison of the make decisions (primarily re-
training costs) compared to buy decision (cost of new hires, layoﬀs, and
worker morale). The costs to workers of retraining depend on their oppor-
tunity wage and the required eﬀort associated with retraining, which de-
pends on how much retraining is required. Workers with skill sets far be-
hind the latest technology will face higher retraining costs but require
lower incentives by the ﬁrm for retention, while workers who are better
matches to the new technology will face lower retraining costs and the in-
centives required by the ﬁrm for retention are higher.
How does the ﬁrm’s product life, and thus rate of R&D spending, aﬀect
how the HRM system operates? We assume that a new technology requires
a mix of experience on the previous generation of technology and new
skills that require formal education (or training). Firms in short product-
life markets, and thus with high R&D spending, must have a mix of engi-
neers with the new skills required for the new technology and engineers
with experience on the last generation of technology, and we assume that
experience and new skills are complements. Firms in long product-life
markets, and thus with low R&D spending, rely more on engineers with
experience because the engineers will focus on cutting costs, improving
quality, and improving throughput over the life of the product.
If worker costs of retraining increases proportionally with size of tech-
nological change (as proxied by R&D), and ﬁrm hiring transaction costs
are invariant to size of technological change, then R&D and ﬂexible hiring
practices will be positively related to worker productivity. In a competitive
labor market, implementation of new technologies in an industry will im-
pact the external market opportunities for engineers. To counteract turn-
over of key workers, who are the workers with skills more compatible with
the new technology, ﬁrms will structure their HRM system to provide in-
centives (both in compensation and in job assignment) in order to retain
workers who match well to the new technology and who face lower per-
sonal retraining costs. How long it is beneﬁcial for the high R&D ﬁrm to
retain and use their technical workers’ skills will determine the incentive
structure implicit in their pay system compared to opportunity market
wages as well as their average tenure (and turnover rate).
Hypothesis1: Firms with high R&D that choose an HRM system that allows
hiring of workers with required skills and fosters retention of selected experi-
enced workers will have higher worker productivity than those that create the
required new skills strictly through retraining of workers or strictly through
new hires.
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innovation, but through incremental improvement in the product and pro-
duction process. Experience is valuable in making these improvements,
and ﬁrms that provide incentives to retain workers will have higher pro-
ductivity. Performance-based pay that is tied to improvements may also
motivate workers to higher productivity, although this pay may be awarded
to a team rather than an individual technical worker in order to encourage
group activity and because evaluating individual contributions may be
diﬃcult.
Hypothesis2: Firms with low R&D that choose an HRM system that fosters
retention of experienced workers and allows some performance-based pay
will have higher worker productivity than those that do not have a compensa-
tion structure that reduces quits and rewards improvements.
In the next section, we discuss the data and measures we will use to ex-
amine the previous hypotheses linking HRM practices to worker produc-
tivity for ﬁrms on diﬀerent technology paths.
1.3 Data Set and Measures
We use data from three sources in our analysis. We use longitudinal and
near-universal individual data from the LEHD program to construct and
characterize the human resource practices of ﬁrms; we add ﬁrm character-
istics from the 1997 Economic Censuses (e.g., measures of revenue, mate-
rial costs, total hours, capital stock, four-digit industry code) as well as
from the 1991 to 1998 Census/National Science Foundation (NSF) R&D
Surveys (ﬁrm-level R&D).
The LEHD data have been extensively described elsewhere (see Halti-
wanger, Lane, and Spletzer 2000; Abowd, Haltiwanger, and Lane 2004),4
but it is worth noting that these data have several advantages over house-
hold-based survey data. In particular, the earnings are quite accurately re-
ported as there are ﬁnancial penalties for misreporting. The data are cur-
rent, and the data set is extremely large.
1.3.1 HRM Variables
In characterizing the human resource practices of a ﬁrm, we utilize the
measures of earnings, earnings growth, accession rate, and separation rate
for selected cohorts within each ﬁrm to create the following components of
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4. The LEHD database consists of quarterly records of the employment and earnings of al-
most all individuals from the unemployment insurance systems of a number of U.S. states in
the 1990s. The UI records have also been matched to internal administrative records at the
Census Bureau that contain information on date of birth, place of birth, race, and sex for all
workers.ﬁrms’ HRM systems for high-education (or professional) workers, who we
know from our ﬁeldwork are primarily technical workers:
• Accession rate: Ratio of the total number of new hires to the total
number of workers in 1997.
• Ratio of mean initial wage to market initial wage: Average wage of new
hires of an individual establishment divided by average wage of new
hires of all establishments in electronics industry (SIC 35 and 36) in
1997.
• Standard deviation of initial earnings: Standard deviation of earnings
of new hires in 1997.
• Separation rate for workers with two years experience: Proportion of
workers who are no longer working for a certain establishment in 1997
among all workers who are hired in 1995 at the same establishment.
• Within-job wage growth for workers with two years experience: Wage
growth between 1995 and 1997 of workers hired in 1995.
• Standard deviation of within-job wage growth for workers with two
years experience: Standard deviation of wage growth between 1995
and 1997 of workers hired in 1995.
• Separation rate of workers with ﬁve years experience: Proportion of
workers who are no longer working for a certain establishment in 1997
among all workers who are hired in 1992 at the same establishment.
• Within-job wage growth for workers with ﬁve years experience: Wage
growth between 1992 and 1997 of workers hired in 1992.
• Standard deviation of within-job wage growth for workers with ﬁve
years experience: Standard deviation of wage growth between 1992
and 1997 of workers hired in 1992.
One limitation of the data is that the current observed HRM practices in
a ﬁrm reﬂect outcomes for workers who are both new to the ﬁrm and have
been at the ﬁrm for any number of years. To capture the entire proﬁle of
workers and their wage growth, it is necessary to use the longitudinal vari-
ation in the data in order to construct the HRM measures. Currently the
limited data on R&D expenditures allows us to examine only one cross sec-
tion of the data, while the HRM measures capture longitudinal variation.
Another limitation for this study is that we lack direct measures of some
important worker and job characteristics, especially education and occu-
pation. We use imputed education values developed by the LEHD staﬀ to
distinguish high-education workers from other types of workers.5
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5. While data on education for the individuals in our sample are not directly observed,
LEHD staﬀ has imputed education for every individual based on probabilistic links to exter-
nal data. The statistical model takes advantage of the common observable characteristics 
in LEHD and Decennial data—most important earnings, industry, geography, gender, and1.3.2 R&D Measure
The following variable represents ﬁrm-level technology practices: R&D
spending rate is measured as the average total R&D costs per payroll over
1991–1998.
Because Census/NSF R&D surveys are conducted at the ﬁrm level, we
assume that all establishments of the same ﬁrm equally beneﬁt from their
ﬁrm level R&D.
Research and development is just one component of ﬁrms’ technology
investment decisions, and as a result it is an imperfect proxy for investment
in technology. However, R&D may be a good proxy for picking up ﬁrm’s
ability to learn and develop new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1989).
Also, because the relationship between R&D and new technology depends
on the success of the investments and the length of period until implemen-
tation takes place, there may be an issue with the timing of investments and
HRM choices. We partition the ﬁrms in our sample into two sets: ﬁrms with
above-mean R&D investment and ﬁrms with below-mean investment.
1.3.3 Firm Performance Measure
To represent ﬁrm performance, we use following productivity measure-
ment: Labor productivity is the log of real value added per total hours
worked where the value added is the establishment-level revenue adjusted
for inventory change net of materials input, and total hours worked include
both production worker hours and nonproduction worker hours.
In the next section, we identify common HRM systems, the underlying
HRM components that diﬀerentiate ﬁrms’ HRM systems, and the rela-
tionship of these components to worker productivity.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
First, we perform a cluster analysis of ﬁrm HRM practices to identify
the most common HRM systems for high-education workers. Next, we em-
ploy principal components analysis to identify groups of correlated HRM
measures. We then implement a principal components regression to exam-
ine the statistical relationship of worker productivity with HRM practices
for diﬀerent technology paths.
1.4.1 HRM Cluster Descriptions
Firms implement HRM practices in bundles, and so we expect a high-
level of correlation of adopted bundles across ﬁrms. We perform cluster
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age—to impute education based on draws from the conditional distribution of educational
categories in the 1990 Decennial Census. Details of the statistical model can be obtained from
the authors.analysis to identify the most common bundles of HRM practices imple-
mented by ﬁrms and to group ﬁrms with similar practices. In order to max-
imize the degree of separations between the groups of ﬁrms, clusters of
ﬁrms are based on canonical variables of HRM variables using Ward’s
minimum variance method.6
In table 1.1, we present the cluster results for the HRM variables for
high-education workers (summary statistics of the ﬁrst four clusters of
HRM practices are reported, and the last group of ﬁrms represents the ag-
gregation of multiple small clusters that are not disclosable according to
Census Bureau conﬁdentiality requirements).
Each cluster represents a prototype HRM system, which we indicate by
name. We then discuss how we think the HRM system is operating within
the ﬁrm based upon the components and our ﬁeldwork observations.
• Cluster 1   Performance-Based Internal Labor Market (ILM): Firms
in Cluster 1 oﬀer lower than average initial earnings and slow, but
steady earnings growth, lower than average turnover and low earn-
ings dispersion. These characteristics are consistent with hiring less-
experienced workers and advancing them along well-deﬁned pay
scales. Entry of workers and their initial earnings reﬂect skill require-
ments, so average initial earnings of new hires are higher and have
higher variance than in a bureaucratic ILM. After approximately two
years, workers are selected (based upon performance) for faster career
development, and members of a cohort compete for entry into these
favored positions, which have higher earnings growth and lower sepa-
ration rates. Those who do not receive skill development have lower
earnings growth and higher separation rates.
• Cluster 2   Spot Market with Rewards: Firms in Cluster 2 exhibit pay
tied to the external labor market (both at entry and with experience)
and above-average turnover. Firms can identify workers’ talents and
skills and hire and pay accordingly (matching is good). Firms can
monitor worker performance and pay workers according to contribu-
tion. Initial earnings and earnings growth reﬂect market rates for skill
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6. In Ward’s minimum-variance method, the distance between two clusters is the analysis
of variance (ANOVA) sum of squares between the two clusters added up over all the variables.
At each generation, the within-cluster sum of squares is minimized over all partitions obtain-
able by merging two clusters from the previous generation (Ward 1963). The assumptions un-
der which Ward’s method joins clusters to maximize the likelihood at each level of the hier-
archy are multivariate normal mixture, equal spherical covariance matrices, and equal
sampling probabilities. Therefore, we ﬁrst obtain approximate estimates of the pooled within-
cluster covariance matrix of the HRM variables when the clusters are assumed to be multi-
variate normal with spherical covariance using the approximate covariance estimation for
clustering developed by Art, Gnanadesikan, and Kettenring (1982). The Approximate Co-
variance Estimation for CLUStering (ACECLUS) procedure provides us with canonical ver-
sions of earnings (or person and ﬁrm eﬀect), earnings growth, and worker churning that we










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.and talent, with large initial variance, and variance does not increase
over tenure. Separation rate is higher than in ILMs.
• Cluster 3   Bureaucratic ILM:Firms in Cluster 3 have very low initial
earnings (with low variance), below-average earnings growth the ﬁrst
two years, and low turnover. Initial earnings of new hires are similar
as most workers enter at the same level and have similar (and reliable)
earnings growth. Firms experience low separation rates.
• Cluster 4   Spot Market: Firms in cluster 4 oﬀer high initial wages
with large variance, below-average earnings growth (with large vari-
ance), and high turnover. Firms hire and pay workers as in spot mar-
ket, but identiﬁcation of worker’s talents and eﬀort at hire is imperfect
and monitoring of worker performance is imperfect. Variance of ini-
tial earnings is higher than in spot markets with rewards. Early sepa-
ration rate is higher than in spot market because the bad matches
(both at hire and in rewards) end.
We ﬁnd that ﬁrms are concentrated in clusters 1 and 3: 37 percent of all
ﬁrms are in Cluster 1, 32 percent are in Cluster 3, 16 percent are in Cluster
2, and 8 percent are in Cluster 4; apparently the primary variables in diﬀ-
erentiating systems are wage variation and initial earnings.
We classify ﬁrms as high or low R&D ﬁrms based on whether their R&D
investment is above or below the mean and present their HRM cluster dis-
tributions in table 1.2. For low R&D ﬁrms, 82 percent are in Clusters 1 and
3 (ILMs), and 14 percent are in Clusters 2 and 4 (spot markets); for high
R&D ﬁrms, 60 percent are in Clusters 1 and 3, and 31 percent in Cluster 2
and 4. This indicates that high R&D ﬁrms are more likely to implement
spot-market-oriented HRM practices than low R&D ﬁrms although there
are still many high R&D ﬁrms in the performance-based ILM cluster. Fur-
ther, low R&D ﬁrms are more likely than high R&D ﬁrms to implement
Bureaucratic ILMs, although there are many low R&D ﬁrms that imple-
ment performance-based ILM.
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Table 1.2 High-education HRM cluster sizes by ﬁrm R&D level
Low R&D ﬁrms High R&D ﬁrms
Cluster 1: Performance-based ILM 120 (16.2) 153 (20.6)
Cluster 2: Spot market with rewards 34 (4.6) 86 (11.6)
Cluster 3: Bureaucratic ILM 125 (16.9) 110 (14.8)
Cluster 4: Spot market 8 (1.1) 49 (6.6)
Residual ﬁrms 13 (1.8) 43 (5.8)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are percentages. HRM = human resource management. 
ILM = internal labor market.1.4.2 HRM Principal Components Analysis
Because ﬁrms adopt discrete bundles of HRM variables, we anticipate a
high degree of multicollinearity across the nine underlying HRM variables.
In order to avoid overﬁtting our regression models, we implement a prin-
cipal components regression framework.
First, we construct the principal components of the underlying HRM
variables using eigenvectors of the correlation matrix as coeﬃcients.7Each
component is a linear combination of the underlying variables, and we re-
tain the combinations that capture the most variance in the underlying
data and then rotate the axes to facilitate interpretation of the components.
In table 1.3, we present a summary of the variance explained by the nine
HRM components. The values in the table represent a proportion of the
eigenvalue from each principal component. We ﬁnd that there is a lead
HRM component with several secondary components of lesser impor-
tance. For the subsequent analysis, we focus on the ﬁrst six components,
which explain 84 percent of the variance for the set of HRM variables.
Table 1.4 reports the HRM component patterns for high-education
workers.8 The ﬁrst component, which we label “ports of entry,” corre-
sponds to a high level of initial earnings relative to market and a high stan-
dard deviation in initial earnings. This is the lead component and indicates
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7. These principal components are then ordered by variance, and the largest components
are retained and then rotated to ease interpretation. Detailed descriptions of the technique
are given in, for example, Sen and Srivastava (1990, 253–55) or Draper and Smith (1981, 327–
32). While this technique has found use in some of the applied statistics literature, the tech-
nique has been shown to produce poor results in certain data sets (e.g., refer to Hadi and Ling
[1998] for illustrations.)
8. The ﬁrst six components from the principal components analysis were orthogonally
transformed through a varimax rotation. Subject to a threshold test of .50 for signiﬁcance,
each human resources (HR) variable has a signiﬁcant loading in exactly one component.
Table 1.3 Explained variance by HRM components
Fraction of  Cumulative










Notes: Variance explained by relative weights of each factor’s eigenvalues from a principal.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.how many ports of entry are used by the ﬁrm, as opposed to hiring at an
entry level and promoting from within. A high value on this component de-
scribes ﬁrms that hire workers at many diﬀerent levels of experience and
skill, which increases the level and variance in initial earnings. The second
component, labeled “turnover rate,” reﬂects a high separation rate after
two and after ﬁve years of tenure. The third component, labeled “wage
growth” reﬂects high levels of within-job wage growth after both two and
ﬁve years of tenure. The fourth component, “hiring rate,” reﬂects the over-
all hiring rate in 1997. The ﬁfth component, “performance incentives,” re-
ﬂects a large variance in within-job earnings growth after ﬁve years tenure,
which indicates that by this point the ﬁrm has selected certain workers for
career development and advancement. The sixth component, “early
matching,” reﬂects a large variance in within-job earnings growth after two
years tenure, which indicates that new hires are already selected for speciﬁc
job tracks and career development.
In table 1.5, to check the correspondence between the components and
the underlying variables, we present the means of each component for the
HRM clusters from the previous section. The ILM systems (Clusters 1 and
3) have negative averages for ports of entry (with bureaucratic much lower
than performance-based). Spot-market systems (Cluster 2 and 4) have pos-
itive means for turnover and for early matching. Overall, the component
scores are consistent with our labeling of the clusters.
We further summarize the components by presenting component means
by R&D level. Table 1.6demonstrates that relative to low R&D ﬁrms, high
R&D ﬁrms exhibit higher values for ports of entry, turnover, wage growth,
hiring rate, early matching, and a lower rate for performance incentives.
These diﬀerences are consistent with the suggestion that high R&D ﬁrms
are more likely to implement more market-oriented HRM systems, and
low R&D ﬁrms are more likely to implement HRM systems with more
long-term performance incentives.
1.4.3 Worker Productivity Regressions
Next, we map the HRM variables for each ﬁrm to continuous variables
corresponding to the components identiﬁed in the preceding and consider
the impact of these HRM components on ﬁrm performance. Speciﬁcally,
we regress productivity on the principal HRM components both with and
without interaction with R&D spending. We measure ﬁrm performance as
log worker productivity and control for log of physical capital (in order to
capture capital intensity) and product market at the four-digit SIC (in or-
der to capture product lifespan diﬀerences). We estimate two speciﬁca-
tions: one speciﬁcation with no R&D interactions and a second speciﬁca-
tion where R&D categories (high, low) are interacted with the HRM
components. We employ principal components as regressors instead of the
underlying HRM variables because of multicollinearity concerns and to






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.address latent variable issues. As a robustness check, we also present re-
sults using a continuous measure of R&D in place of the dichotomous
R&D measure.
We observe that several HRM components are related to worker pro-
ductivity (see table 1.7). Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms with high levels of R&D invest-
ment are likely to beneﬁt from HRM systems with multiple ports of entry,
performance incentives, and lower turnover, while ﬁrms with low R&D are
likely to beneﬁt from HRM systems without early matching.
Firms with multiple ports of entry, which facilitate the hiring of workers
with required skills, have higher labor productivity. This eﬀect is more im-
portant (and signiﬁcant) in the high R&D ﬁrms, which supports Hypothe-
sis 1. Performance-based pay appears to be more important in high R&D
ﬁrms than in low R&D ﬁrms. Firms with higher separation (turnover) rates
appear to have lower ﬁrm performance, although this is signiﬁcant only for
high R&D ﬁrms. The eﬀect of turnover rate on worker productivity ap-
pears to be signiﬁcant only for high R&D ﬁrms, which does not support
Hypothesis 2. Because these statistical relationships do not control for
ﬁrms growing or shrinking, separation rates and hiring rates may reﬂect
poor performing ﬁrms losing workers and high performing ﬁrms adding
workers. Firms with early matching or sorting of workers appear to have
lower worker productivity, although this is signiﬁcant only for low R&D
ﬁrms.
In tables 1.8and 1.9, we examine the robustness of our results to changes
in the construction of the R&D measure. Instead of the dichotomous mea-
sure used in the previous analysis, we examine if the results are robust to
use of a continuous measure of R&D intensity. In table 1.8 we reestimate
the model in table 1.7 where ﬁrm performance is a function of capital-labor
ratio, continuous R&D, and HRM components. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation,
we have no R&D-HRM interactions; in the second speciﬁcation, we inter-
act HRM practices with the continuous R&D measure. In speciﬁcation 1,
we ﬁnd very similar results to the model estimated with dichotomous
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Table 1.6 High-education HRM component means by ﬁrm R&D level
Low R&D ﬁrms High R&D ﬁrms
Component 1: Ports of entry –0.283 0.121
Component 2: Turnover rate –0.023 0.016
Component 3: Wage growth –0.100 0.058
Component 4: Hiring rate –0.143 0.017
Component 5: Performance incentives 0.058 –0.141
Component 6: Early matching –0.058 –0.004
N 300 441
Notes: See text for deﬁnition of components. HRM = human resource management.Table 1.7 High-education HRM components on ﬁrm performance





C1: Ports of entry 0.0837***
(0.0272)
C1 × low R&D 0.0577*
(0.0323)
C1 × high R&D 0.1397**
(0.0500)
C2: Turnover rate –0.0564**
(0.0264)
C2 × low R&D –0.0132
(0.0413)
C2 × high R&D –0.0829**
(0.0346)
C3: Wage growth 0.0137
(0.0251)
C3 × low R&D 0.0014
(0.0352)
C3 × high R&D 0.0307
(0.0359)
C4: Hiring rate 0.0389
(0.0262)
C4 × low R&D 0.0842
(0.0540)
C4 × high R&D 0.0326
(0.0297)
C5: Performance incentives 0.0284
(0.0252)
C5 × low R&D 0.0124
(0.0406)
C5 × high R&D 0.0614*
(0.0339)
C6: Early matching –0.0146
(0.0246)
C6 × low R&D –0.0709**
(0.0355)




Notes:Dependent variable is log worker productivity. Both speciﬁcations include controls for
four-digit SIC. Standard errors in parentheses. HRM = human resource management.
*Denotes signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
**Denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
***Denotes signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.R&D. However, when we examine the interactions in speciﬁcation 2, we
ﬁnd diﬀerences between the continuous and dichotomous models. In the
continuous R&D model, the turnover HRM practice (Component 2) is no
longer signiﬁcant, but the performance incentive practice (Component 5)
is signiﬁcant.
The diﬀerences in the interaction terms in the continuous and dichoto-
mous models suggest that the relationship between R&D intensity and
38 Fredrik Andersson et al.
Table 1.8 High-education HRM components and continuous R&D on 
ﬁrm performance

































Note: See table 1.7 notes.
*Denotes signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
**Denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
***Denotes signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.HRM practices are not linear. In table 1.9, we estimate a model where we
control for continuous R&D, but interact the HRM components with the
dichotomous R&D indicator. We ﬁnd highly similar results to the di-
chotomous interactions presented in table 1.7. Taken together, the two
models suggest that the largest eﬀect attributable to the interactions be-
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R&D (continuous) × low 0.0357
(0.0247)
R&D (continuous) × high 0.0448
(0.0467)
C1 × low R&D 0.0552*
(0.0324)
C1 × high R&D 0.1247**
(0.0524)
C2 × low R&D –0.0125
(0.0413)
C2 × high R&D –0.0823***
(0.0346)
C3 × low R&D –0.0025
(0.0353)
C3 × high R&D 0.0293
(0.0360)
C4 × low R&D 0.0882
(0.0541)
C4 × high R&D 0.0254
(0.0303)
C5 × low R&D 0.0206
(0.0411)
C5 × high R&D 0.0611*
(0.0343)
C6 × low R&D –0.0716***
(0.0356)




Note: See table 1.7 notes.
*Denotes signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
**Denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
***Denotes signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.tween R&D and HRM components occurs at the high-end of the R&D
scale.
Overall, the regression results provide some preliminary evidence for
Hypothesis 1 and mixed support for Hypothesis 2. The analysis suggests
that high R&D ﬁrms beneﬁt from HRM systems that oﬀer multiple ports
of entry, low turnover, and performance incentives, while low R&D ﬁrms
beneﬁt from HRM systems that oﬀer multiple ports of entry and low wage
variance for recent hires. The empirical results for high R&D ﬁrms are 
consistent with Hypothesis 1 because ﬁrms have higher productivity if they
implement systems that allow hiring at many ports of entry and have tools
to retain and retrain key workers. The empirical results on low R&D ﬁrms
provide mixed support for Hypothesis 2. We do ﬁnd that low turnover is
correlated with ﬁrm performance; however, we did not hypothesize that
ports of entry would play a substantial role in determining ﬁrm perfor-
mance, and we do not ﬁnd performance-based pay to have as large an im-
pact as hypothesized. Although the ﬂexibility in hiring at multiple ports 
of entry does not go with our strict rendition of ILM systems, this result 
is consistent with other empirical analyses that have found multiple ports
of entry in ILMs (Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994; Lazear and Oyer
2004).
1.5 Discussion
This chapter presents evidence of the relationship between ﬁrms’ tech-
nology investment decisions, HRM practices, and productivity. We ﬁnd
that in the high-tech electronics industry, there is a positive correlation be-
tween performance and buying new skills (i.e., hiring at many ports of en-
try) for both high and low R&D ﬁrms, but the relationship is considerably
stronger for high R&D ﬁrms. Interestingly, high R&D ﬁrms beneﬁt from
lower turnover and from having earnings that reward performance over a
ﬁve-year period, which indicates that ﬁrms need to keep their technical
workers, and the skills they have, for one project generation and into the
next generation. Low R&D ﬁrms beneﬁt from treating their workers com-
parably once they are hired, which indicates a positive correlation between
performance and making new skills over time. In other words, high R&D
ﬁrms appear to be more productive if they implement performance-based
ILM systems, while low R&D ﬁrms appear to be more productive if they
implement a modiﬁed bureaucratic ILM system that allows hiring at mul-
tiple ports of entry with comparable treatment once hired.
A key underlying assumption of our research method is that we can 
infer HRM practices statistically from administrative data. Although it
would be interesting to compare our inferred HRM practices to company
descriptions or employee perceptions of HRM systems in place, the data
do not allow this. Fieldwork observations indicate that actual practices
40 Fredrik Andersson et al.and company-described HRM policies are often divergent (Pfeﬀer and
Sutton 1999). Our inferred practices are consistent with our previous re-
search on the semiconductor industry, where we directly observed HRM
practices through ﬁeld work. Using extensive data collected from in-depth
site visits, Brown and Campbell (2001) demonstrate that more-advanced
semiconductor fabrication plants pay higher initial wages and have shorter
career paths than less-advanced plants. These results from the ﬁeld work
data are similar to the results in this administrative data-based project. The
similarity provides evidence that inferring HRM practices from adminis-
trative data is a sound practice.
A strength of this research is the richness of the data set utilized com-
bined with interpretation through the lens of detailed industry knowledge.
There is very little research that ties observed ﬁrm-level HRM systems to
performance outcomes: the LEHD data allows us to analyze HRM sys-
tems and outcomes within ﬁrms for a large sample of ﬁrms, and the de-
tailed industry knowledge allows us to understand the important issues
and the context of the results. While the LEHD data provide ample sample
sizes and longitudinal variation, the lack of direct measures of workers’
skills or occupation and of technological change constrains the statistical
estimation and limits our interpretation of the results.
Although these results must be interpreted with care, they have poten-
tial implications for understanding the mechanisms that tie together tech-
nological change and workers’ outcomes. Because technological change
impacts workers at the plant level, knowledge of how HRM systems inter-
act with technological investment to drive productivity at the plant level
will inform our understanding of how labor markets work in technologi-
cally dynamic industries.
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